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Abstract: BACKGROUND Digital proximity tracing (DPT) apps have been released to mitigate SARS-
CoV-2 transmission. But it remains unclear how their acceptance and uptake can be improved. OB-
JECTIVE This study aimed to investigate SwissCovid app coverage and reasons for not using the app
in Switzerland during a time of increasing SARS-CoV-2 incidence. METHODS By use of data collected
between 28.09.2020 to 08.10.2020 for a nationwide online panel survey (Covid-19 Social Monitor, n=1’511
participants), socio-demographic and behavioral factors associated with app usage were examined using
multivariable logistic regression. Reasons for app non-use were analyzed descriptively. RESULTS Over-
all, 46.5% of participants reported using the SwissCovid app (up from 43.9% in a study wave conducted
in July 2020). A higher monthly household income (e.g., OR 1.92 [1.40-2.64] for an income >CHF 10’000
vs. an income ฀ CHF 6’000), more frequent internet use (e.g., daily (reference) vs. less than weekly
OR 0.37 [0.16-0.85]), better adherence to mask-wearing recommendations (e.g., always or most of the
time (reference) vs. rarely or never OR 0.28 [0.15-0.52]), and being a non-smoker (OR 1.32 [1.01-1.71])
were associated with an increased likelihood for app uptake. Citizenship status (e.g., non-Swiss citi-
zenship 0.61 [0.43-0.87] vs. Swiss citizenship only), and language region (French 0.61 [0.46-0.80], vs.
Swiss German) were associated with a lower app uptake probability. In a randomly selected subsample
(n=711) with more detailed information, higher levels of trust in government and health authorities were
additionally associated with a higher app uptake probability (e.g., OR 3.13 [1.58-6.22] for high vs. low
trust (reference)). The most frequent reasons for app non-use was lack of perceived benefit of the app
(36.8%), 22.8% reported having no compatible phone, and 22.4% had privacy concerns. CONCLUSIONS
Removing technical hurdles and communicating the benefits of DPT-apps are crucial to promote further
uptake, adherence, and ultimately to enhance effectiveness of DPT-apps for pandemic mitigation.
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Background: Digital proximity tracing apps have been released to mitigate the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus known
to cause COVID-19. However, it remains unclear how the acceptance and uptake of these apps can be improved.
Objective: This study aimed to investigate the coverage of the SwissCovid app and the reasons for its nonuse in Switzerland
during a period of increasing incidence of COVID-19 cases.
Methods: We collected data between September 28 and October 8, 2020, via a nationwide online panel survey (COVID-19
Social Monitor, N=1511). We examined sociodemographic and behavioral factors associated with app use by using multivariable
logistic regression, whereas reasons for app nonuse were analyzed descriptively.
Results: Overall, 46.5% (703/1511) of the survey participants reported they used the SwissCovid app, which was an increase
from 43.9% (662/1508) reported in the previous study wave conducted in July 2020. A higher monthly household income (ie,
income >CHF 10,000 or >US $11,000 vs income ≤CHF 6000 or <US $6600 [reference]: odds ratio [OR] 1.92, 95% CI 1.40-2.64),
more frequent internet use (ie, daily [reference] vs less than weekly: OR 0.37, 95% CI 0.16-0.85), better adherence to
recommendations for wearing masks (ie, always or most of the time [reference] vs rarely or never: OR 0.28, 95% CI 0.15-0.52),
and nonsmoker status (OR 1.32, 95% CI 1.01-1.71) were associated with an increased likelihood for app uptake. Citizenship
status (ie, non-Swiss citizenship vs. Swiss [reference]: OR 0.61, 95% CI 0.43-0.87), and language region (French vs Swiss German
[reference]: OR 0.61, 95% CI 0.46-0.80) were associated with a lower likelihood for app uptake. Further analysis in a randomly
selected subsample (n=712) with more detailed information showed that higher levels of trust in government and health authorities
were also associated with a higher likelihood for app uptake (ie, high vs low [reference] trust: OR 3.13, 95% CI 1.58-6.22). The
most frequent reasons for app nonuse were lack of perceived benefit of using the app (297/808, 36.8%), followed by the lack of
a compatible phone (184/808, 22.8%), and privacy concerns (181/808, 22.4%).
Conclusions: Eliminating technical hurdles and communicating the benefits of digital proximity tracing apps are crucial to
promote further uptake and adherence of such apps and, ultimately, enhance their effectiveness to aid pandemic mitigation
strategies.
(JMIR Public Health Surveill 2021;7(1):e25701) doi: 10.2196/25701
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Safe and effective vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, the causative
agent of COVID-19, are not largely available in most countries.
Therefore, global and national health authorities continue to
rely on nonpharmaceutical interventions in their fight against
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Cornerstones of pandemic
mitigation measures include testing, tracing, isolation, and
quarantine [1]. Digital proximity tracing (DPT) apps are
expected to further enhance conventional mitigation measures,
and classic, interview-based contact tracing in particular. These
apps constitute a novel, still largely untested health technology
that anonymously records the user’s proximity contacts, that is,
other app users who were within a prespecified radius for a
certain amount of time [2]. In case the app user tests positive
for COVID-19, they can notify their proximity contacts in an
anonymous manner through such DPT apps.
The rationales for using DPT apps as pandemic mitigation tools
are based on a modelling study, which suggests that DPT alone
has the ability to stop the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic
[3,4]. Classic contact tracing is labor- and time-consuming, and
exposed contacts can sometimes only be reached and notified
with substantial time lags [5]. By comparison, DPT can lead to
faster notification and earlier self-quarantine of exposed contacts
[3,6]. In addition, DPT has a wider reach than classic contact
tracing, as it also includes exposed contacts that the infected
person may not know by name (eg, chance encounters in a
public space). However, the modelling studies further suggest
that these expected effects of digital contact tracing depend on
several assumptions. Specifically, a considerable proportion of
the population must use the DPT app (eg, 60% and more if no
other mitigation measures are implemented), the turnaround
time of test results and digital notification of exposed contacts
must be within 1-2 days and notified contacts should enter
self-quarantine immediately [3,7].
How the Swiss DPT App (SwissCovid) Works
The Swiss DPT app, officially named “SwissCovid,” follows
the blueprint of decentralized, privacy-preserving proximity
tracing (DP-3T). Detailed explanations of the DP-3T design
can be found elsewhere [2,6]. The DP-3T app architecture has
also become the basis for national DPT apps in countries such
as Italy or Germany, and it has gained the support of Apple and
Google, who provide application programming interfaces to
support the app’s functionality [8].
The SwissCovid app was publicly released on June 25, 2020
[9]. Similar to other DP-3T–inspired apps, smartphones with
the SwissCovid app installed will send and receive Bluetooth
Low Energy signals to and from other smartphones that also
have the same app installed. Ephemeral, nonidentifiable keys
are exchanged and stored locally on smartphones. As Bluetooth
signals weaken with increasing distance between devices, signal
attenuation can be employed to determine whether another
phone or device was in close proximity (eg, <1.5 meters) and,
if so, for how long. If any app user tests positive for COVID-19,
this person will be issued an activation code (CovidCode) that
should be entered into the SwissCovid app. By doing so, the
user releases their ephemeral keys, which are then uploaded
onto a central server system.
Smartphones with DP-3T–based apps regularly connect to this
central server. The uploaded keys of users with known infection
are downloaded by all smartphones using the SwissCovid app,
and the smartphone user’s locally stored encounter-history (ie,
the list of exchanged keys) will be searched for matches with
keys of infected users. If matches fulfilling the criteria for a
close proximity encounter (<1.5 meters over at least 15 minutes)
are found, the smartphone owner will be notified and advised
to call an Infoline for further assistance. Users who receive such
a notification are also advised to enter self-quarantine and
undergo testing for COVID-19.
Thus, the effect of proximity tracing on pandemic containment
is mediated by users being notified about possible exposure
risks as soon as possible and entering quarantine to break further
transmission chains (ie, by being “one step ahead”). However,
emerging data from Switzerland indicate that procedural aspects
(eg, speed of laboratory test results and delivery of CovidCodes)
and user behavior (eg, the period before contacting the infoline
after receiving an app notification of contact with another app
user who has tested positive) have an influence on the
performance of the DPT app notification cascade [10,11]. For
example, frequent delays in issuing activation codes for app
users who have tested positive for COVID-19 also delayed
notification of exposed contacts (monitored in [12]).
Study Aims
DPT technologies have been developed and implemented with
very limited real-life testing [1,13]. It currently remains unclear
whether, and to what extent, assumptions stated by the modelling
analyses are achievable under real-world conditions and whether
these technologies can ultimately have a significant impact on
the effectiveness of pandemic mitigation strategies [13,14].
Therefore, in this study, we aimed to investigate and synthesize
to what extent some of the conditions for DPT functioning
(namely, broad app uptake) were fulfilled during the first 3
months after the release of the SwissCovid app in Switzerland.
Our analyses addressed 3 main research questions: (1) Which
sociodemographic and health-related factors are associated with
use of the SwissCovid app? (2) What are the most prominent
concerns for nonuse of the SwissCovid app? (3) What is known
about the adherence of app users with the recommended
procedures in case of an app notification indicating proximity
contact with another app user who has tested positive for
COVID-19? To answer these questions, we analyzed data
collected from a web-based nationwide, survey panel,
complemented by publicly available data.
Methods
Data Source
This study was based on survey data collected from the Swiss
COVID-19 Social Monitor project [15], a cohort study of
participants randomly selected from an existing online panel
population. A weighted sample from the panel, stratified based
on age, gender, and language region, was used in order to make
the sample representative of the Swiss population. Participants
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of this cohort receive an invitation every 2-6 weeks to complete
a survey on various COVID-19 related topics. The survey was
started on March 30, 2020; thus far, 10 study waves have been
conducted, each with an average response from 1500-1700
persons from across Switzerland. All datasets generated and/or
analyzed during this study are available from the corresponding
author on reasonable request.
The Swiss COVID-19 Social Monitor project collects
information on sociodemographic features, comorbidities, and
implementation of preventive measures related to COVID-19.
In addition, 3 standardized questions were introduced to gather
information about the use of the Swiss DPT app (SwissCovid;
see Table S1 in Multimedia Appendix 1). The questions were
jointly developed by study investigators, epidemiologists, and
infectious disease experts. The standardized SwissCovid
app-related questions were first introduced in Wave 8 and
subsequently used in Waves 9 and 10.
The primary data source for these analyses was Wave 10 of the
Swiss COVID-19 Social Monitor project (September 28 to
October 8, 2020), which yielded responses from 1511
participants. Additional data on media use and trust in
government, health authorities, or science, were collected for a
randomly selected subsample in Wave 10 (n=712; Table S2 in
Multimedia Appendix 1). Furthermore, data from 1299
participants were collected from Wave 8 (July 13-20, 2020) as
well as Wave 10, which were used for analyzing
within-person-changes in SwissCovid app use over time and
reasons for app nonuse over time. Data from Waves 8, 9 (August
17-25, 2020), and 10 were used to evaluate user responses to
app notifications.
Context of the Pandemic Situation
The observation period for this study started from app release
on June 25, 2020, to approximately 3 months thereafter. By
early October 2020, the app was downloaded 2.4 million times,
and the number of active users was relatively stable at 1.6
million [12]. Active users were counted as the daily number of
app dummy requests sent to the proximity tracing system, which
tends to underestimate the real number of users [16]. Compared
with Switzerland’s population size of 8.6 million persons of all
age groups (6.6 million in the age group between 18 and 79
years), the number of active app users corresponds to a
population coverage of approximately 19% (24.2% among those
aged 18-79 years).
In hindsight, the time period of this survey marked the starting
point for large increases in the incidence of COVID-19 cases
in Switzerland. A total of 8114 new COVID-19 cases (based
on positive polymerase chain reaction tests) were reported
during the study period, that is, from September 28, 2020, to
October 8, 2020. By contrast, the number of new COVID-19
cases was considerably lower in the preceding 11-day period
(ie, 3644 cases during September 17-27, 2020) [17].
Ethics Statement
For the COVID-19 Social Monitor project, the Ethics Committee
of the Canton of Zurich confirmed that it does not fall under
the Swiss Human Research Law (BASEC-Nr. Req-2020-00323).
Therefore, informed consent from participants was not needed.
Measures
To study the uptake of the SwissCovid app, users and nonusers
were compared by age (in 10-year categories), gender,
partnership status, having children, citizenship, language region,
education status, employment status, household income,
smoking status, presence of self-reported comorbidities (eg,
respiratory diseases, cardiovascular diseases, stroke,
hypertension, diabetes, and cancer), application of preventive
measures (eg, wearing masks and staying at home except for
essential tasks), frequency of internet use, trust in government
and health authorities, and trust in science. Individuals who
reported they used the app permanently or who turned it off
only occasionally were considered “app users” for the purpose
of this study. Other individuals who reported not using the app
(either with or without an intention to do so later) were
considered “app nonusers.”
Statistical Analyses
Factors Associated With App Uptake
Descriptive analyses were performed by summarizing
continuous data as medians (interquartile ranges) and categorical
data as percentages. Changes in app use status between Waves
8 and 10 were also analyzed descriptively among participants
who contributed to both waves.
To investigate factors associated with app use, multivariable
logistic regression models were constructed using the
abovementioned measures as variables of interest. Age, gender,
and comorbidity status were included as a priori fixed
co-variables in all models; the remaining variables, including
an a priori defined interaction term for age and gender, were
added incrementally and retained if the Akaike Information
Coefficient decreased by 2 points or more upon variable addition
[18,19]. Further logistic regression analyses on the association
between app use and media use and trust in government or
science were performed for the subset of participants for whom
this information was available. Results from regression analyses
are reported as odds ratio (OR) with 95% confidence intervals.
Investigation of Reasons for App Nonuse
Reasons for nonuse of the SwissCovid app were further explored
descriptively represented as n (%) based on the answer options
provided, as well as an open answer field for describing other
reasons. The analysis was limited to one primary reason for
each participant. Sociodemographic and other characteristics
as listed above were compared descriptively across the 3 most
frequent reasons for app nonuse, as well as a fourth group
subsuming all other reasons. All analyses were performed using
Stata version 13 (Stata Corp).
Results
Sample Characteristics
The Wave 10 survey yielded 1511 responses; participant
characteristics are shown in Table 1. The median age of survey
participants was 48 years, and 48.8% (738/1511) were female.
Almost two-thirds (975/1511, 64.5%) of the participants lived
in the German language region, 22.1% (334/1511) lived in the
French language region, and 13.4% (202/1511) lived in the
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Italian language regions. Furthermore, 46.5% (703/1511) of the
participants reported to have the app installed, of which 7.7%
(116/1511) occasionally switched it off. By comparison, app
installation coverage was 43.9% (662/1508) in Wave 8 (data
not shown). Among the 1299 respondents participating in both
Waves 8 and 10, only 75 of 733 (10.2%) app nonusers from
Wave 8 had the app installed by Wave 10 (data not shown).
However, 5.3% (30/566) of the app users from Wave 8 had
uninstalled the app by Wave 10.
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2021 | vol. 7 | iss. 1 | e25701 | p. 4http://publichealth.jmir.org/2021/1/e25701/
(page number not for citation purposes)
von Wyl et alJMIR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SURVEILLANCE
XSL•FO
RenderX









46 (34, 59)49 (35, 58)48 (34, 59)Age, median (IQR)
349 (49.6)389 (48.1)738 (48.8)Gender, female, n (%)
Partnership status, n (%) 
194 (27.6)246 (30.4)440 (29.1)No partner
461 (65.6)490 (60.6)951 (62.9)Living with partner
48 (6.8)72 (8.9)120 (7.9)Not living with partner
71 (10.1)92 (11.4)163 (10.8)Has children, yes, n (%)
Citizenship status, n (%) 
596 (84.8)624 (77.2)1220 (80.7)Swiss
46 (6.5)83 (10.3)129 (8.5)Swiss and other
61 (8.7)101 (12.5)162 (10.7)Non-Swiss
Language region, n (%) 
481 (68.4)494 (61.1)975 (64.5)German
134 (19.1)200 (24.8)334 (22.1)French
88 (12.5)114 (14.1)202 (13.4)Ticino
Education, n (%) 
33 (4.7)60 (7.4)93 (6.2)Only mandatory schooling
322 (45.8)406 (50.2)728 (48.2)Completed professional education
348 (49.5)342 (42.3)690 (45.7)University or university of applied sciences
503 (71.6)563 (69.7)1066 (70.5)Currently employed, n (%)
Monthly household income, n (%) 
151 (21.5)246 (30.4)397 (26.3)≤CHF 6000 (US $6600)
230 (32.7)261 (32.3)491 (32.5)CHF 6000-10,000 (US $6600-11,000)
197 (28)146 (18.1)343 (22.7)>CHF 10,000 (US $11,000)
125 (17.8)155 (19.2)280 (18.5)No answer
125 (17.8)188 (23.3)313 (20.7)Smoker, yes, n (%)
181 (25.7)197 (24.4)378 (25)Self-reported chronic illnessa, n (%)
Use of protective masks, n (%)
468 (66.6)494 (61.1)962 (63.7)Always or most of the time
220 (31.3)264 (32.7)484 (32)Sometimes
15 (2.1)50 (6.2)65 (4.3)Rarely or never
Staying at home except for essential tasks, n (%) 
185 (26.3)224 (27.7)409 (27.1)Always or most of the time
306 (43.5)316 (39.1)622 (41.2)Sometimes
212 (30.2)268 (33.2)480 (31.8)Rarely or never
Frequency of internet use, n (%)
644 (91.6)685 (84.8)1329 (88)Once daily or several times a day
51 (7.3)99 (12.3)150 (9.9)Once weekly or several days per week
8 (1.1)24 (3)32 (2.1)Never or less than once weekly
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, n (%) 
13/337 (3.9)47/375 (12.5)60/712 (8.4)Little
61/337 (18.1)102/375 (27.2)163/712 (22.9)Somewhat




16/336 (4.8)42/374 (11.2)58/710 (8.2)Little
78/336 (23.2)129/374 (34.5)207/710 (29.2)Somewhat
242/336 (72)203/374 (54.3)445/710 (62.7)Large
SwissCovid app use, n (%)  
N/AN/Ac587 (38.8)App user
N/AN/A116 (7.7)App user, occasionally switching off the app
N/AN/A53 (3.5)Intends to use the app
N/AN/A66 (4.4)Has uninstalled app
N/AN/A689 (45.6)Not using the app
aPresence of chronic illness was defined based on self-reporting of at least one of the following conditions: asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, stroke, and cancer.
bData only available in a randomly selected split-sample, including 47.1% (712/1511) of the full study population.
cN/A: not applicable.
Factors Associated With App Uptake
Multivariable logistic regression analyses revealed that several
factors were associated with app uptake (see Table 2). Analysis
of the full study sample showed that citizenship status (Swiss
and second citizenship: OR 0.58, 95% CI 0.40-0.86; non–Swiss
citizenship: OR 0.61, 95% CI 0.43-0.87 vs Swiss citizenship
only), and language region (French-speaking region: OR 0.61,
95% CI 0.46-0.80; Italian-speaking region: OR 0.78, 95% CI
0.57-1.08 vs German-speaking region) were associated with
lower app uptake.
By contrast, a higher monthly household income (OR 1.92, 95%
CI 1.40-2.64 for an income >CHF 10,000 [US $11,000] vs
income ≤CHF 6000 [US $6600]), more frequent internet use
(daily [reference] vs less than weekly: OR 0.37, 95% CI
0.16-0.85), better adherence to mask-wearing recommendations
(always or most of the time [reference] vs rarely or never OR
0.28, 95% CI 0.15-0.52), and nonsmoker status (OR 1.32, 95%
CI 1.01-1.71) were associated with increased app uptake.
The same model was also applied to the random subsample (see
Table 2), which provided additional information on trust in
government and science (n=712). Of note, ORs of variables
included in both multivariable models (ie, full and subsample)
were not altered substantially, but CIs became wider due to the
lower sample size. Furthermore, increasing levels of trust in
government and health authorities were also associated with a
higher likelihood of app uptake (OR 3.13, 95% CI 1.58-6.22
for high vs low [reference] trust), whereas the inclusion of trust
in science did not improve the multivariable model fit.
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2021 | vol. 7 | iss. 1 | e25701 | p. 6http://publichealth.jmir.org/2021/1/e25701/
(page number not for citation purposes)
von Wyl et alJMIR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SURVEILLANCE
XSL•FO
RenderX
Table 2. Results of a multivariable logistic regression analysis investigating factors associated with the use of the SwissCovid app
Value, odds ratio (95% CIs)Characteristic
Multivariable; random sub-
sample interviewed on trust






1.09 (0.98, 1.22)0.99 (0.92, 1.06)1 (0.99; 1.01)Age (per 10 years)
0.94 (0.68, 1.30)1.10 (0.89, 1.36)1.06 (0.87, 1.30)Female Gender (vs male)
Partnership status
N/AN/AbrefaNo partner
N/AN/A1.19 (0.95, 1.50)Living with partner
N/AN/A0.85 (0.56, 1.27)Not living with partner
N/AN/A0.87 (0.63, 1.21)Has children (vs not)
Citizenship status 
refrefrefSwiss
0.52 (0.28, 0.96)0.58 (0.40, 0.86)0.58 (0.40, 0.85)Swiss and other
0.68 (0.39, 1.20)0.61 (0.43, 0.87)0.63 (0.45, 0.89)Non-Swiss
Language region 
refrefrefGerman
0.56 (0.37, 0.84)0.61 (0.46, 0.80)0.69 (0.53, 0.89)French
0.90 (0.54, 1.51)0.78 (0.57, 1.08)0.79 (0.58, 1.08)Ticino
Education 
refrefrefOnly mandatory schooling
1.23 (0.57, 2.63)1.32 (0.83, 2.12)1.44 (0.92, 2.26)Completed professional education
1.58 (0.73, 3.45)1.50 (0.94, 2.42)1.85 (1.18, 2.90)University or university of applied sciences
N/AN/A0.91 (0.73, 1.14)Currently employed (vs unemployed)
Monthly household income 
refrefref≤CHF 6000 (US $6600)
1.14 (0.75, 1.74)1.29 (0.97, 1.71)1.44 (1.10, 1.88)CHF 6000-10,000 (US $6600-11,000)
1.53 (0.94, 2.48)1.92 (1.40, 2.64)2.20 (1.64, 2.95)>CHF 10,000 (US $11,000)
1.06 (0.66, 1.71)1.18 (0.85, 1.63)1.31 (0.96, 1.79)No answer
1.51 (1.02, 2.25)1.32 (1.01, 1.71)1.40 (1.09, 1.81)Nonsmoker (vs smoker)
0.88 (0.61, 1.27)1.11 (0.87, 1.43)1.08 (0.85, 1.36)Self-reported chronic illnessc (vs none)
Use of protective masks 
refrefrefAlways or most of the time
0.77 (0.54, 1.10)0.75 (0.60, 0.96)0.88 (0.71, 1.10)Sometimes
0.32 (0.12, 0.86)0.28 (0.15, 0.52)0.32 (0.18, 0.57)Rarely or never
Staying at home except for essential tasks
N/AN/ArefAlways or most of the time
N/AN/A1.17 (0.91, 1.51)Sometimes
N/AN/A0.96 (0.73, 1.25)Rarely or never
Frequency of internet use
refrefrefOnce daily or several times a day
0.59 (0.35, 1.00)0.55 (0.38, 0.80)0.55 (0.38, 0.78)Once weekly or several days per week
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Value, odds ratio (95% CIs)Characteristic
Multivariable; random sub-
sample interviewed on trust






0.32 (0.11, 0.95)0.37 (0.16, 0.85)0.35 (0.16, 0.79)Never or less than once weekly
Trust in government or health authorities
d
refN/ArefLittle
1.71 (0.82, 3.58)N/A2.16 (1.08, 4.32)Somewhat







bN/A: data not applicable or not included because it did not improve model fit
cPresence of chronic illness was defined based on self-reporting of at least one of the following conditions: asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, stroke, and cancer.
dData only available in a randomly selected split-sample, including 47% (712/1511) of the full study population.
Reasons for App Nonuse
The responses of participants who reported not having used the
app (808/1511) were analyzed further with respect to the reasons
for app nonuse (Table 3). This group included both users who
stated that they intended to use the app and those who did not
intend to use it. Overall, the most important reasons for not
installing the app were a perceived lack of usefulness of the app
(297/808, 36.8%), followed by not having a suitable smartphone
or operating system (184/808, 22.8%), and concerns about
privacy (181/808, 22.4%). Other reasons (amounting to 18%)
included lack of knowledge about the app, doubts about
technological reliability, and concerns about excessive battery
usage, among other reasons.
When compared to responses from Wave 8, the proportion of
app nonusers (846/1508, 56.1%) who reported a perceived lack
of app usefulness (228/846, 27%) was considerably lower.
Moreover, the differences between waves for the other reasons
of app nonuse (ie, not having the right phone: 221/846, 26.1%;
privacy concerns: 202/846, 23.9%; and other reasons: 195/846,
23%; data not shown) were less pronounced.
As shown in Table 3, the distribution of reasons for app nonuse
also varied with participants’ intentions for using the app later
(ie, maybe, no, or already uninstalled the app). While the lack
of perceived benefits was the dominant reason for not installing
the app (262/689, 38%) and having uninstalled (20/66, 30.3%)
it, 34% (18/53) of the participants who intended to install the
app at a later time point reported not having a compatible
smartphone. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that excessive battery
consumption also appeared to be an important reason for
uninstalling the app (11/66, 16.7%).
The descriptive comparison of sociodemographic and other
characteristics across the 3 major reasons for app nonuse (and
a fourth category subsuming all other reasons; see Table 4)
suggests that some reasons may be more prevalent in specific
subgroups. The subpopulation citing problems with installing
the app (“not the right phone”) was the oldest (median age, 57.5
years), had the highest burden of chronic comorbidities (61/184,
33.2%), and tended to have high trust in government (large trust
category: 69/89, 77.5%) and science (large trust category: 61/89,
68.5%) compared with the other subgroups. By contrast, those
reporting privacy concerns for app nonuse were younger
(median age: 44 years), more frequently living in the
French-speaking part of Switzerland (65/181, 35.9%), and
generally had less trust in the government (large trust category:
35/80, 43.8%) or science (large trust category: 30/80, 37.5%).
No specific patterns were observed for the demographics of
subpopulations reporting the remaining 2 reasons (ie, “not
useful” and “other reasons”).
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App not installed (n=689)May install app later (n=53)
297 (36.8)20 (30.3)262 (38)15 (28.3)Perceived as not useful
184 (22.8)8 (12.1)158 (22.9)18 (34)Not the right phone
181 (22.4)9 (13.6)164 (23.8)8 (15.1)Concerned about privacy
27 (3.3)0 (0)25 (3.6)2 (3.8)Don't know the app
25 (3.1)4 (6.1)20 (2.9)1 (1.9)Technical doubts about reliability, maturity
20 (2.5)11 (16.7)8 (1.2)1 (1.9)Concerned about battery use
10 (1.2)1 (1.5)9 (1.3)0 (0)Don't believe in seriousness of Corona; lack
of trust in government
7 (0.9)0 (0)2 (0.3)5 (9.4)Inertia, not had the time yet
7 (0.9)0 (0)7 (1)0 (0)Opposed out of principle, no specific reason
5 (0.6)2 (3)3 (0.4)0 (0)Don't want Bluetooth permanently on
4 (0.5)2 (3)2 (0.3)0 (0)Worried about consequences/quarantine
4 (0.5)0 (0)3 (0.4)1 (1.9)Currently outside of Switzerland
3 (0.4)1 (1.5)2 (0.3)0 (0)Would have to turn off app at work
2 (0.2)0 (0)2 (0.3)0 (0)Would feel stressed/scared by app use
1 (0.1)0 (0)1 (0.1)0 (0)Already protecting themselves, rarely leave
the house
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Not the right phone
(n=184)
44 (31, 57)46 (31, 57)44 (35, 54)57.5 (44.5, 67)Age, median (IQR)
72 (49.3)120 (40.4)102 (56.4)95 (51.6)Gender, female, n (%)
Partnership status, n (%) 
43 (29.5)100 (33.7)58 (32)45 (24.5)No partner
89 (61)172 (57.9)106 (58.6)123 (66.8)Living with partner
14 (9.6)25 (8.4)17 (9.4)16 (8.7)Not living with partner
29 (19.9)27 (9.1)21 (11.6)15 (8.2)Has children
Citizenship status, n (%) 
108 (74)232 (78.1)132 (72.9)152 (82.6)Swiss
17 (11.6)35 (11.8)21 (11.6)10 (5.4)Swiss and other
21 (14.4)30 (10.1)28 (15.5)22 (12)Non-Swiss
Language region, n (%) 
91 (62.3)188 (63.3)100 (55.2)115 (62.5)German
30 (20.5)64 (21.5)65 (35.9)41 (22.3)French
25 (17.1)45 (15.2)16 (8.8)28 (15.2)Ticino
Education, n (%) 
6 (4.1)22 (7.4)16 (8.8)16 (8.7)Only mandatory schooling
76 (52.1)157 (52.9)83 (45.9)90 (48.9)Completed professional education
64 (43.8)118 (39.7)82 (45.3)78 (42.4)University or university of applied sciences
105 (71.9)221 (74.4)140 (77.3)97 (52.7)Currently employed, n (%)
Monthly household income, n (%) 
42 (28.8)87 (29.3)52 (28.7)65 (35.3)≤CHF 6000 (US $6600)
47 (32.2)104 (35)48 (26.5)62 (33.7)CHF 6000-10,000 (US $6600-11,000)
30 (20.5)61 (20.5)30 (16.6)25 (13.6)>CHF 10,000 (US $11,000)
27 (18.5)45 (15.2)51 (28.2)32 (17.4)No answer
27 (18.5)78 (26.3)47 (26)36 (19.6)Smoker, n (%)
27 (18.5)66 (22.2)43 (23.8)61 (33.2)Self-reported chronic illnessa, n (%)
Use of protective masks, n (%) 
85 (58.2)172 (57.9)110 (60.8)127 (69)Always or most of the time
46 (31.5)106 (35.7)62 (34.3)50 (27.2)Sometimes
15 (10.3)19 (6.4)9 (5)7 (3.8)Rarely or never
Staying at home except for essential tasks, n (%) 
39 (26.7)83 (27.9)48 (26.5)54 (29.3)Always or most of the time
49 (33.6)108 (36.4)69 (38.1)90 (48.9)Sometimes
58 (39.7)106 (35.7)64 (35.4)40 (21.7)Rarely or never
Frequency of internet use, n (%) 
126 (86.3)257 (86.5)160 (88.4)142 (77.2)Once daily or several times a day
17 (11.6)36 (12.1)14 (7.7)32 (17.4)Once weekly or several days per week
3 (2.1)4 (1.3)7 (3.9)10 (5.4)Never or less than once weekly
Trust in government
b
, n (%) 
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Not the right phone
(n=184)
14 (21.2)12 (8.6)16 (20)5 (5.6)Little
15 (22.7)43 (30.7)29 (36.3)15 (16.9)Somewhat
37 (56.1)85 (60.7)35 (43.8)69 (77.5)Large
Trust in science
b
, n (%) 
10 (15.2)12 (8.6)13 (16.3)7 (7.9)Little
24 (36.4)47 (33.8)37 (46.3)21 (23.6)Somewhat
32 (48.5)80 (57.6)30 (37.5)61 (68.5)Large
aPresence of chronic illness was defined based on self-reporting of at least one of the following conditions: asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, stroke, and cancer.
bData only available in a randomly selected split-sample, including 50% of the full study population (n=712). New denominators for respective reasons
of app nonuse were not right phone (n=89), privacy concerns (n=80), not useful (n=140), and other (n=66).
SwissCovid App Notifications and User Response
In the 3 survey waves (Waves 8, 9, and 10), a total of 15
participants reported having received an app notification: 2 users
in Wave 8 (July), 6 users in Wave 9 (August), and 7 users in
Wave 10 (October). Overall, 8 of these 15 (53.3%) users
reported to have called the recommended infoline, whereas the
remaining 6 users reported not to have undertaken any steps,
and 1 user undertook other steps, which were left unspecified.
Since Wave 10, participants were also asked whether they had
undergone COVID-19 testing in the past 4 weeks and, if so,
what their test results were. Of the 5 users who called the
infoline at Wave 10, 2 users reported to have undergone




By analyzing information on the use of the SwissCovid app
from a longitudinal, web-based, panel survey, we evaluated
factors related to the use of the DPT app in Switzerland.
Our data suggested that, 3 months after app release, 46.5% of
the survey respondents had downloaded the app (of whom
38.8% had the SwissCovid app permanently activated). This
proportion is an overestimation of actual app coverage in the
general population and is most likely caused by the
above-average affinity for such technologies of online panel
participants. Moreover, social desirability might have led to
some over-reporting of app use, despite this being an anonymous
online survey [20]. In early October 2020, the official number
of active app users was estimated at 1.6 million [12], which
implies that around 1 in 4 (24.2%) adults residing in Switzerland
were actively using the app. A recent modelling study suggests
that this proportion of app uptake may, in fact, be sufficient to
reduce the number of new infections to “manageable levels”
[21].
We also deduced several population characteristics that may
influence the uptake of the SwissCovid app. For example,
younger age, higher income, or a nonsmoker status were
associated with a higher app uptake. In contrast, characteristics
such as foreign (non-Swiss) nationality or living in the French-
or Italian-speaking regions of Switzerland were associated with
a lower app uptake. Furthermore, app uptake was associated
with the level of trust placed in the government and health
authorities. Following recommended preventive measures and
wearing masks, in particular, were also associated with a higher
likelihood to use the app, which could imply higher levels of
awareness, worry related to the COVID-19 pandemic, or
increased health consciousness.
We further investigated participants’ stated reasons for nonuse
of the SwissCovid app, which were dominated by technical
aspects (ie, not having a suitable smartphone or operating
system), privacy concerns, and perceived lack of usefulness.
Ignorance or lack of information about the app did not seem to
be a relevant reason, as only 3% of the participants cited this
as a reason (ie, “don’t know the app”). Privacy concerns as a
reason for app nonuse were associated with a lack of trust in
the government and health authorities, as well as with a
migration background. Participants whose app use was hindered
owing to technical reasons seemed to be more trustful in the
government but tended to be older. Therefore, streamlining
installation processes and establishing compatibility with older
phone devices may be worthwhile in order to increase app
uptake among this subgroup.
Comparison With Previous Work
To our knowledge, this is the first study since the SwissCovid
app release to systematically investigate DPT app uptake and
the reasons for app nonuse in Switzerland. One survey was
conducted since the app release in late-June 2020 in Switzerland,
comprising 1000 Swiss individuals [22]; however, the data have
not been published in detail. This previous study found that
43% of the Swiss population were using or considering using
the Swiss proximity tracing app, with higher percentages
observed among younger respondents. Our study results show
similar proportions of app users.
Overall, our findings also correspond well with other
international population surveys of DPT app use, most of which
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were performed before [23-29], and some after app release [30].
For example, several studies confirmed the finding that higher
education status [25], and younger age [23] were associated
with a higher willingness to use DPT apps. Of note, these
characteristics could reflect the profile of typical early adopters
of technology [31]. On the other hand, the observed
sociodemographic patterns could also reflect generally higher
health- and digital literacy among DPT app users. This
alternative explanation raises concerns about the existence of
a digital divide [32], in which individual who may benefit the
most from the preventive effect of DPT are the least likely to
use the app. Nevertheless, as suggested by a separate analysis
of the COVID-19 Social Monitor project data, the majority of
elderly persons adhered well to other preventive measures such
as social distancing [33]. Furthermore, it can also be argued
that transmission prevention among younger persons, who are
disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 incidence in
Switzerland, may also yield a protective effect for older adults.
This study adds to the scarce literature on motivations, as well
as technical and nontechnical barriers for app use in settings
where apps have already been deployed. Previous studies have
utilized models based on psychology such as the health belief
model (HBM) [29] and implementation science such as the
normalization process theory (NPT) [10] to analyze adoption
and nontechnical implementation challenges for DPT apps.
Both these models emphasize the importance of a perceived
benefit of preventive interventions, with HBM focusing on
individuals and NPT focusing on a systems perspective [34].
The lack of perceived benefits was also a major reason for app
nonuse in our survey, cited by 37% of all nonusers. Therefore,
according to HBM and NPT, communicating usefulness of the
app to individual and the society may be key to achieve greater
app adoption; this can be achieved by testimonials of users who
have had a positive experience with the DPT app. Moreover,
optimizing economic incentives or removing existing
disincentives for DPT use may further improve the benefit-risk
balance [35,36]. In Switzerland, users who received an app
notification were eligible for a free COVID-19 test, but
quarantine was neither mandatory nor subject to salary
compensations (which is currently being reconsidered).
Our observations of technical problems and persistent privacy
concerns as reasons for nonuse or uninstallations of the
SwissCovid app are consistent with those of a study in Australia
[30], which reported similar user complaints. Furthermore, (a
lack of) government trust emerged as a strong influencing factor
for app usage in our and other surveys [23]. For example,
approximately 11% of the respondents of the Australian survey
cited government mistrust as a reason for not using the app [30].
In Switzerland, there was an early, rather strong consensus that
the DPT app must be issued and managed by the government
[37]. Nevertheless, the prevalent and persistent privacy concerns
and trust issues remain to be challenging. For example, although
the SwissCovid app implements privacy by design, the fact that
the app relies on application programming interfaces provided
by Google and Apple is sometimes still criticized. One solution
to address this challenge could be to establish an independent
oversight committee for the management of DPT operations
[38]. Such committees would demonstrate transparency and
increase public trust that governments will hold their promises,
for example, to maintain voluntariness, prevent mission creep,
or cease the use of DPT after the end of the pandemic.
Finally, we found evidence that external factors and the overall
pandemic context have an effect on benefit and threat
perceptions (as postulated by HBM [29]). In Switzerland,
COVID-19 cases increased rapidly during the second half of
October 2020, and the number of active app users also increased
by 200,000 [12]. Similarly, the dominant reasons for app nonuse
seem to have evolved in our study. Taken together, these
observations suggest that public knowledge, perceptions, and
app uptake respond dynamically to the pandemic situation. In
line with these suggestions, first reports from vaccine
development trials [39] raise hopes for a nearing availability of
effective COVID-19 vaccines, which may also impact the public
discourse on DPT apps. However, initial vaccination campaigns
will likely focus on elderly subpopulations, who are at the
greatest risk for a more severe disease course [40]. Given current
limitations in vaccine production capacity, herd immunity will
remain unachievable in the near future. Therefore, DPT apps
will likely continue to play an important role in pandemic
mitigation efforts, particularly among younger subpopulations
wherein COVID-19 cases are often asymptomatic [40] and DPT
app use is comparatively high.
Strengths and Limitations
Overall, our analysis contributes to the literature by being among
the first studies to longitudinally investigate DPT app use
patterns in the context of a changing pandemic. A key strength
of our study is the availability of data from different survey
waves, which allowed us to verify the robustness of our findings.
Furthermore, our sample of 1500 participants is based on a
random sample and is therefore likely to be quite representative
with respect to age, gender, and language region for the Swiss
population. However, we cannot fully exclude potential biases
such as over-reporting or social desirability bias regarding app
use. In addition, the fact that the Social Monitor project sample
was drawn from an online panel population might have led to
an overestimation of the app use among the general population.
Conclusions
To summarize, our study findings provide a clearer
understanding of the motivations, barriers, and other factors
associated with the uptake of DPT apps. Our data points toward
complex interactions between motivations, trust, and incentives.
Our study also reveals significant research gaps; for example,
regarding how to effectively persuade persons with privacy
concerns or how to create equitable incentives for app use.
Similar studies are needed to evaluate the contribution of DPT
on pandemic mitigation efforts, as well as generic, robust
research methods to study privacy-preserving health
technologies. From a practical perspective, our data suggest
that DPT sponsors should scale-up communication efforts to
not only build trust and mitigate privacy fears but also reduce
technical challenges, as well as simplify onboarding procedures
in order to reach a broader population, including persons with
low digital or health literacy.
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